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A dynamical view of different solution
paradigms in two-person symmetric games:
Nash vs. co-action equilibria
V. Sasidevan and Sitabhra Sinha
Abstract The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights
for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical
systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular,
using this perspective, we discuss the differences between two solution concepts for
such games - namely, those of Nash equilibrium and co-action equilibrium. For the
Nash equilibrium, we show that the dynamical view can provide an equilibrium
refinement, selecting one equilibrium among several possibilities, thereby solving
the issue of multiple equilibria that appear in some games. We illustrate in detail
this dynamical perspective by considering three well known 2-person games namely
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, game of Chicken and the Stag-Hunt. We find that in all of
these cases, co-action equilibria tends to correspond to ‘nicer’ strategies than those
corresponding to Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
Games represent strategic interactions between entities generally referred to as
agents. Here, the term “agents” could refer to a variety of entities, ranging from
human beings or animals to computer programs or robots. In games, each agent
receives a payoff depending upon the strategy choice made by all agents includ-
ing herself. Thus, an agent who wants to optimize her payoff should consider not
only the payoff structure of the game, but also the decision making processes of
other agents. The choice of strategy by each agent in such an interaction leads to
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a collective outcome that may or may not be globally optimal. In this context, it is
imperative to understand how two agents facing a game situation, who have to make
a strategic decision, will go about doing it, since the strategic interaction between
agents is the basis of the collective behavior in a system comprising such agents. Fi-
nancial markets, for example, may be viewed as the collective outcome of strategic
interactions between a large number of people participating in it. Another example
is that of evolution, where one may view evolution by natural selection as a result
of the interaction between competing genes. Cooperation and conflict is at the heart
of such systems and forms the subject matter of the study of games. In games, in
general, each agent should have a behavior model of other agents so that she has a
way to describe the decision making process of other agents. In this regard, standard
game theory makes several assumptions about the agent’s behavior. It assumes that
agents are fully rational and would like to optimize their payoff and they are perfect
in execution of their strategies (see for e.g [1] for a detailed discussion). While the
applicability of these assumptions in any particular situation is open to criticism,
they form an important benchmark for optimal behavior. In fact, these assumptions
form an important part of modern economic theory in which the participating agents
are often assumed to be fully rational.
The simplest of games consists of the strategic interaction between two agents
in a single play of the game. In fact, 2-person games like Prisoners Dilemma, Stag-
Hunt etc., describe very general socio-economic scenarios, towards the analysis of
which considerable effort has been devoted. A key concept in the study of games is
that of an “equilibrium” . It refers to a state of affairs where each agent has decided
her strategy for the game at hand. How the agents pick their equilibrium strategy is
given by a solution concept. A solution concept thus is a formal rule for predicting
how a game will be played between agents and employs certain assumptions regard-
ing agent’s behavior. An important solution concept for non-cooperative games is
that of Nash equilibrium. Informally, it is a state where after every agent has selected
their ‘Nash’ strategies, none of the agents can improve their payoff by unilaterally
deviating from it. It is to be noted that a game may have more than one Nash equi-
librium.
In this article, we show that the equilibria of a game may be viewed as the “fixed-
point” equilibria of a dynamical system. In particular, we present a dynamical view
of the equilibria obtained by two different solution concepts, viz., Nash [2] and
co-action [3], the latter being a concept that makes use of the symmetry between
the agents for payoff-symmetric games. The vector flow diagrams on the strategy
space that is generated using the dynamics approach makes the differences between
the equilibria obtained in the two solution concepts visually apparent. For the Nash
equilibrium, we argue that a dynamical perspective may be regarded as an equilib-
rium refinement selecting one equilibrium out of several possible ones, thus solving
the multiplicity issue. We illustrate these points by considering three well known
examples of 2-person games, namely the Prisoners Dilemma, Game of Chicken and
Stag-Hunt.
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Fig. 1 A generic representa-
tion of the payoff matrix for
a 2-person symmetric game
where each agent has two
actions available to her.
2 A dynamical framework for analyzing 2-person games
Here we describe a dynamical perspective for analyzing games, focusing on 2-
person single-stage games in which two agents interact only once. No communi-
cation is allowed between the agents. Furthermore, we consider the simple case
where each agent has to choose one of two possible actions (say, Action 1 and Ac-
tion 2) available to her. Each agent receives a payoff according to the pair of choices
made by them, such that the game may be represented by a payoff matrix that speci-
fies all possible outcomes (Fig. 1). We consider situations where the game is payoff
symmetric, i.e., on exchanging the identities of the players (A,B), the payoff matrix
remains unchanged. Note that most 2-person games that are studied in the literature
fulfil the above criteria. Given the payoff matrix, an agent can have a mixed strategy,
where she chooses Action 1 with some probability p and Action 2 with probability
(1− p). If p is either 0 or 1, it is called a pure strategy. Given a game, represented by
a matrix containing the numerical values of R,S,T and P (or a hierarchical relation
among them), Nash equilibrium is defined as a state - i.e., a set of the choices made
by all the agents - where no agent can increase her payoff by unilaterally deviating
from the Nash state. A Nash equilibrium comprising pure strategies may be found
by a search procedure, whereby each possible state is explicitly examined for the
above criterion. Note that a given game can have more than one Nash equilibrium,
possibly involving mixed strategies. In such cases, the choice of a particular equilib-
rium will have to involve additional refinement criteria, which is an important area
of research in game theory [4].
We now illustrate a dynamical perspective on Nash equilibria by first defining
payoff functions for all possible mixed strategies of the two agents. Assuming that
agent A (B) chooses Action 1 with probability p1 (p2) and Action 2 with probability
1− p1 (1− p2, respectively), the expected payoffs of the agents are
WA = p1 p2R+ p1(1− p2)S+(1− p1)p2T +(1− p1)(1− p2)P, (1)
WB = p1 p2R+ p1(1− p2)T +(1− p1)p2S+(1− p1)(1− p2)P. (2)
As the payoffs are continuous functions of p1 and p2, they can be represented as
two-dimensional surfaces (Fig. 2) analogous to fitness landscapes in biology or en-
ergy landscapes in physics. However, unlike the latter, there are two distinct surfaces
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Fig. 2 The payoff functions WA and WB for two agents playing the game of Chicken, shown as
functions of p1 and p2, i.e., the probability of each agent to choose Action 1. The payoffs (in terms
of the terminology given in Fig. 1) are T = 3.5, R = 1, S = 0.5 and P = 0.
for the two agents, and each of them would like to achieve the maximum of their
respective payoff functions, a goal that may not be mutually compatible. By con-
trast, the evolution of the state of a physical system can be seen as a convergence
process to a minimum of a single function, e.g., the free energy that describes the
entire system.
Given the payoff function surfaces we can now proceed to find the strategy pairs
(p∗1, p∗2) that correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Note that while the Nash solution
is usually not defined in terms of a dynamical perspective, one can view (p∗1, p∗2) as
an equilibrium point for flow dynamics in the p1− p2 plane, as described below.
The initial condition for this dynamical system can be any arbitrary point in this
plane. Each agent is then allowed to change its strategy infinitesimally (i.e., p1 →
p1 + d p1, p2 → p2 + d p2) in order to improve their respective payoffs, taking into
consideration that the other agent would also be doing the same. A sequence of such
incremental changes, which will be manifested as a flow in the p1− p2 plane would
eventually converge to an equilibrium point (p∗1, p∗2). Note that, while such a strategy
would correspond to a stable equilibrium of the flow dynamics, there may also be
unstable equilibria.
The dynamical equations governing the flow can be derived by considering the
change in the payoffs (dWA,dWB) of the two agents as a result of the infinitesimal
change in their strategies d p1,d p2:
∂WA
∂ p1
= p2(R−T)+ (1− p2)S,
∂WB
∂ p2
= p1(R−T)+ (1− p1)S. (3)
Thus, on any point in the p1− p2 plane, the magnitude and direction of the flow can
be obtained by a vector sum of the two components given by Eq. 3. The resulting
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flow diagram will describe the trajectory in strategy space starting from any arbitrary
strategy pair (p1, p2). This will be illustrated with specific examples of 2-person
games in the next section.
As mentioned earlier, Nash equilibrium is not the only possible solution of a pay-
off symmetric game. Recently, an alternative paradigm referred to as co-action equi-
librium for solving such games has been introduced in the specific context of mi-
nority game [3]. Here we study this novel solution concept in the context of generic
2-person games with symmetric payoff from a dynamical perspective. The key no-
tion of co-action equilibrium is: as the two agents are aware that they face an exactly
symmetric situation, the choice made by agent A should be identical to the choice
of agent B, assuming that they are equally rational (for a detailed discussion see
Ref. [5]). Thus, in terms of the flow dynamics introduced above, in this solution
concept, each agent will take into account in her calculation for revising her strat-
egy that the other agent is not only using the same strategy (i.e., p1 = p2) but will
also make exactly the same infinitesimal change, i.e., d p1 = d p2. Then the change
in the payoffs of the two agents, as a result of changing p1, p2 (analogous to Eq. 3
for Nash equilibrium) is:
∂WA
∂ p1
= 2p1R+(1− 2p1)(T + S),
∂WB
∂ p2
= 2p2R+(1− 2p2)(T + S). (4)
Note that the above equations hold not only when p1 = p2 = p (so that the dynamics
is confined to the diagonal line in the p1− p2 plane), but also for situations where
the two agents initially start with different strategies (p1 6= p2), believing however
that the other agent is using exactly the same strategy.
The co-action solution yields results that differ remarkably from those obtained
using the concept of Nash equilibrium, some of which will be described in the next
section in the context of specific 2-person games. An important distinction is that
while there could be multiple Nash equilibria for a game, the corresponding co-
action equilibrium is unique. The dynamical perspective allows us to also distin-
guish between Nash and co-action solutions for 2-person symmetric games in that
a stable mixed strategy equilibrium is possible for the latter unlike in the former
(Nash) where a mixed strategy equilibrium, if it exists, is always unstable.
Note that while the flow diagrams produced by the dynamical process presented
here may resemble the trajectories generated by solving replicator equations [6], the
two approaches are essentially distinct. In particular, the latter approach is based on
the concept of evolutionary stable strategies, which is an equilibrium refinement of
the Nash solution. Also, instead of being stages in the evolutionary progression of
a population, the sequence of infinitesimal changes in strategies in the dynamical
approach presented here, can be interpreted as steps in the deductive reasoning of
the two agents, at the end of which they choose the strategy corresponding to the
equilibrium they converge to. When our approach is applied to study the Nash so-
lution of a game, it can also be viewed as an equilibrium refinement as, if there are
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multiple Nash equilibria, it allows agents to choose a particular equilibrium depend-
ing on the arbitrarily chosen initial state. Thus, in an ensemble of many realizations
of a game, the fraction of cases where agents will converge to a particular equilib-
rium is proportional to the size of its basin of attraction. An unstable equilibrium
(if it exists) will lie on the separatrix that demarcates the basins of different stable
equilibria.
3 Examples
We now illustrate the approach outlined in the previous section using three well-
studied 2-person symmetric games, viz., Prisoner’s Dilemma, Game of Chicken and
Stag-Hunt, each of which can be connected to real-life scenarios involving interac-
tions between a pair of agents who have to choose between two possible actions.
Each of these games is defined in terms of a specific hierarchical relationship be-
tween the payoffs R, S, T and P (using the terminology of the payoff matrix in
Fig. 1). Without loss of generality, we can set P = 0 and R = 1 (thereby fixing the
origin and the scale for the payoffs), leaving only S and T as free parameters. In
the following subsections, we discuss each of these games in turn, describing the
meaning of the different choices available to the agents (viz. Action 1 and Action 2)
in a particular game, and exploring the different equilibria obtained by using Nash
and co-action solution concepts.
3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [7] can be regarded as one of the most well-known games
in the literature. It has evoked great interest among researchers from a multitude of
disciplines ranging from social sciences and politics to biology and physics, from
the 1950s onwards and continues to do so at present (a good place to read about
historical developments in PD is the corresponding entry in the online Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy [8]). The game represents the strategic interaction between
two players who have to choose between cooperation (Action 1) and defection (Ac-
tion 2). The different payoffs are interpreted as follows: R is a “reward” for both
players cooperating, P is a “punishment” for both players defecting, while, in the
event that one agent defects while the other cooperates, T and S are the “temptation”
received by former and the “sucker’s payoff” of the latter. In PD, the hierarchical
relation between the payoffs is T > R > P > S, which makes achieving mutual co-
operation non-trivial as each player will benefit more by defecting (assuming that
the other will cooperate).
It is easy to see that mutual defection is the only Nash equilibrium for PD. As
Action 1 represents cooperation, p1 (p2) corresponds to the probability that agent A
(B) will choose cooperation. As discussed in the previous section, we can associate
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Fig. 3 Vector flow diagram representation of the Nash solution of the 2-person Prisoners Dilemma
game for temptation payoffs (left) T = 1.5 and (right) T = 3.5. The abscissae and ordinate corre-
spond to the probabilities (p1 and p2) that players 1 and 2, respectively, choose to cooperate. The
broken lines represent the best response (or reaction) correspondence of the players (red for player
1, blue for player 2). The intersection of the lines, represented by a filled circle, represent the single
Nash equilibrium corresponding to both players defecting (i.e., p1 = 0, p2 = 0).
a vector with each point in the (p1, p2) plane for the game which describes the flow
from that point. Fig. 3 shows the resulting flow diagrams obtained using the Nash
solution concept for two different values of the temptation payoff T (keeping S
fixed at −0.5). In both cases, the system converges to the pure strategy p1 = p2 = 0
(mutual defection), which is the Nash equilibrium for PD.
By contrast, using the co-action solution concept, for low values of T we observe
mutual cooperation (i.e., p1 = p2 = 1) as the stable equilibrium of the system (Fig. 4,
left). For larger values of T , the stable equilibrium corresponds to a mixed strategy,
0 < p1 = p2 < 1 (Fig. 4, right). Thus, as discussed in detail in Ref. [5], using the co-
action concept for solving PD we can show that selfish agents trying to maximize
their individual payoffs can also achieve the state of maximum collective benefit.
This resolves a contentious aspect associated with the Nash solution of PD, where
the agents end up worse off in trying to optimize their individual payoffs [9].
3.2 Chicken
The Game of Chicken (also referred to as Snowdrift) [2] is another well-studied 2-
person game which is relevant in the context of social interactions [10] as well as
evolutionary biology [11] (where it is also known as Hawk-Dove). The game repre-
sents a strategic interaction between two players, who are driving towards each other
in a potential collision course, and have the choice between “chickening out”, i.e.,
swerving away from the path of the other (Action 1) or continuing on the path (Ac-
tion 2). Thus, the choices correspond to being docile or aggressive, respectively. If
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Fig. 4 Vector flow diagram representation of the co-action solution of the 2-person Prisoners
Dilemma game for temptation payoffs (left) T = 1.5 and (right) T = 3.5. The abscissae and or-
dinate correspond to the probabilities (p1 and p2) that players 1 and 2, respectively, choose to
cooperate. The broken line represents the situation where the two agents have the same probability
of cooperation. The filled circles represent the unique co-action equilibrium for each value of T
corresponding to the players cooperating with equal probability (= 1 for T = 1.5 and = 0.75 for
T = 3.5).
both players decide to swerve away, they receive the payoff R, while if one swerves
and the other continues on the path, the former loses face (getting the payoff S)
and the latter wins (payoff T ). However, the worst possible outcome corresponds to
when both players continue on the path, eventually resulting in a collision which is
associated with payoff P. The hierarchical relation between the payoffs in Chicken
is T > R > S > P, which suggests that a player will benefit from being aggressive
as long as the other is docile, but is better off being docile if it is sure that the other
will play aggressively, as the cost of mutually aggressive behavior is high.
Analyzing this game using the dynamical perspective described earlier yields the
flow diagram shown in Fig.5 (obtained for two different values of T , with S = 0.5)
on using the Nash solution concept. As can be seen, two of the multiple Nash equi-
libria are stable, corresponding to the pure strategies (i) p1 = 1, p2 = 0 and (ii)
p1 = 0, p2 = 1 (i.e., when one player is aggressive, the other is docile). The remain-
ing equilibrium is an unstable mixed strategy located on the p1 = p2 line (which
defines the separatrix demarcating the basins of attraction of the two stable equilib-
ria). With increasing T , the unstable equilibrium - which dynamically corresponds
to a saddle point in the p1− p2 plane - moves closer to p1 = 0, p2 = 0 corresponding
to mutual aggression.
Using the co-action solution concept gives rise to a qualitatively different solu-
tion, as seen in the flow diagrams in Fig. 6. When T is low, the system has a stable
equilibrium at p1 = 1, p2 = 1, i.e., both agents choose docile behavior to avoid the
potential damages associated with mutual aggression. For higher values of T the
stable equilibrium is a mixed strategy 0 < p1 = p2 < 1. As in PD, the co-action
paradigm yields a single, stable solution of the game.
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Fig. 5 Vector flow diagram representation of the Nash solution of the 2-person Chicken game
for “temptation” payoffs (left) T = 1.5 and (right) T = 3.5. The abscissae and ordinate corre-
spond to the probabilities (p1 and p2) that players 1 and 2, respectively, choose to be docile (i.e.,
non-aggressive). The broken lines represent the best response (or reaction) correspondence of the
players (red for player 1, blue for player 2). The intersections of the lines, represented by unfilled
and filled circles, represent the unstable and stable Nash equilibria respectively. The stable equilib-
ria correspond to the pure strategy combination corresponding to one player being aggressive, the
other being docile, while the unstable equilibrium in each case corresponds to a mixed strategy.
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Fig. 6 Vector flow diagram representation of the co-action solution of the 2-person Chicken game
for “temptation” payoffs (left) T = 1.5 and (right) T = 3.5. The abscissae and ordinate corre-
spond to the probabilities (p1 and p2) that players 1 and 2, respectively, choose to be docile (i.e.,
non-aggressive). The broken line represents the situation where the two agents have the same prob-
ability of being docile. The filled circles represent the unique co-action equilibrium for each value
of T corresponding to the players choosing to be docile with equal probability (= 1 for T = 1.5
and = 2/3 for T = 3.5).
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Fig. 7 Vector flow diagram representation of the (left) Nash and (right) co-action solutions of the
2-person Stag-Hunt game for T = 0.5 and S =−0.5. The abscissae and ordinate correspond to the
probabilities (p1 and p2) that players 1 and 2, respectively, choose ‘Stag’ instead of ‘Hare’. (left)
The broken lines represent the best response (or reaction) correspondence of the players (red for
player 1, blue for player 2). The broken line represents the situation where the two agents have the
same probability of choosing ’stag’.
3.3 Stag-Hunt
The last of our examples, Stag-Hunt is a 2-person game that has been studied in
the context of emergence of coordination in social interactions [12]. The game rep-
resents a strategic interaction between two players who have to choose between
hunting stag (Action 1) or hunting hare (Action 2). A hare may be caught by a sin-
gle agent but is worth less than a stag. On the other hand, hunting a stag is successful
only if both agents hunt for it. Thus, if both agents cooperate by hunting stag they
receive the highest payoff R. On the other hand, if they both choose to hunt hare,
they receive the payoff P. However, if one chooses to hunt hare while the other goes
for a stag, then the former receives the payoff T while the latter receives the worst
possible payoff S. Thus, in Stag-Hunt, the hierarchical relation between the payoffs
is R > T ≥ P > S, which suggests that while choosing to hunt hare may be the safer
option, there is a possibility of doing much better by choosing to hunt stag if one is
confident that the other will also do the same.
The vector flow diagrams for Nash and co-action solution concepts in the Stag-
Hunt are shown in Fig.7 (obtained for T = 0.5 and S = −0.5). For Nash, as in the
game of Chicken, there are three equilibria (Fig. 7, left), of which the pure strategies,
corresponding to (i) p1 = 1, p2 = 1 and (ii) p1 = 0, p2 = 0 are stable (i.e., when both
players hunt for stag or when both players hunt hare). The remaining equilibrium
is an unstable mixed strategy located on the p1 = p2 line which again defines the
separatrix demarcating the basins of attraction of the two stable equilibria.
The co-action solution for the games (Fig. 7, right) is a simple one in which
both agents always choose hunting stag. i.e, p1 = p2 = 1. Thus, under the co-action
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concept, the players always converge to the best possible outcome. In this case, there
is no mixed strategy equilibrium for any value of the parameters.
4 Conclusions
In this article we have shown that using a dynamical perspective allows us a visu-
ally appealing way to differentiate between two solution concepts, viz., Nash and
co-action, for 2-person, symmetric games which lead to spectacularly different con-
clusions. To illustrate these differences in details we looked at three examples of
such games in detail: Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken and Stag-Hunt. In all of these
games, one action - in particular, Action 1 in the terminology used here - corre-
sponds to the players being “nicer” to each other (e.g., cooperating in PD, etc.)
compared to the other action. The vector flow diagrams generated by the approach
presented here clearly show that co-action more often results in nicer strategies be-
ing converged at by the agents than in the case for Nash. Our results are intriguing in
view of the experimental literature on 2-person games (see discussion in Ref. [9]),
in particular PD, which seems to suggest that when these games are played between
real human individuals they tend to be far nicer than suggested by the Nash solution.
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careful reading of the manuscript.
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